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WHOSE TEAM AM I ON ANYWAY?
MUSINGS OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER
ABOUT DRUG TREATMENT COURT PRACTICE
MA C. QUINN*
I.
INTRODUCrION
Over the last decade or so, players in the criminal justice system have
begun to rethink the ways in which courts handle drug-related crime.' As a
result, courts throughout the country have established treatment-based
programs. Perhaps the most popular of these developments have been
specialized, drug treatment courts.
Due to their purported promise and reported success, drug treatment
court initiatives have received much attention, praise, and funding to en-
courage their development. 4 While the "movement 's towards the treat-
ment court model has gained ever-increasing popularity, the legal
* Staff Attorney, The Bronx Defenders, 1999-present. LLM., 2001, Georgetown
University Law Center. J.D., 1995, The University of Texas at Austin School of Law. B.A.,
1991, State University of New York at Albany. My thanks to John Copacino, Jenny
Kronenfeld, B. Kele McComsey, Florian Meidel, William Montross, Nicole Mull, Ward
Oliver, and Robin Steinberg for their comments and contributions. Many thanks also to the
staff of the N.Y U. Review of Law & Social Change, and in particular Alba R. Morales, for
thoughtful and diligent editorial work on this paper.
1. See generally THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION
(W. Clinton Terry III ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE EAnLY DRUG COURTS]; Michael C. Dorf
& Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53
VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000); STEvEN BELENKO & TAmARA Du~ttiovsk-Y, BUREAU OF Jus.
TiCE ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T or JusTI E, SPECIAL DRUG
COURTS: PROGRA BRIEF (1993) [hereinafter SPECIAL DRUG COURTS], available at http'JI
www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesfspdc.txt; DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PRO.
GRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOOKING AT A DECADE o DRUG COURTS (1998) [herein-
after DECADE OF DRUG COURTS], available at httpl/ojp.usdoj.govldcpoldecade9S.htm.
2. See Stephen Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT'L DRUG
CT. INsT. REv. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Belenko, Critical Review] (discussing various treat-
ment-based programs that have been used within criminal courts over last twenty years,
including Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC), diversionary programs, and
drug-treatment as condition of pretrial release); see also Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora, Hon.
William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treat-
ment Court MovemenL Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug
Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAmtE L. REv. 439,452-54 (1999) (explaining that
drug courts fall into one of two categories: those with the goal of efficiently disposing of
drug cases and those which actually concentrate on treating drug addiction).
3. See Belenko, Critical Review, supra note 2, at 4 (indicating that by April 1998 spe-
cialized drug treatment courts had been implemented in 275 jurisdictions).
4. Id.; see also Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attor-
ney General Reno Announces Funds to Continue Successful Drug Court Program (June 3,
1999), available at httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/dcpoldcpopr63.htm (announcing that another
$14 million was awarded to 147 jurisdictions to "expand, enhance or plan drug courts to
37
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community, including the criminal defense bar, has neglected to provide
rigorous critique or analysis of it in legal literature.6 This is somewhat sur-
prising because the new model purportedly makes a fundamental change in
the traditional litigation-based process by espousing a nonadversarial,
"team work" approach among all of the court's players-judge, prosecutor,
and defense attorney-to move drug-addicted persons to sobriety.
This article seeks to contribute to drug treatment court discourse by
analyzing drug treatment court practices from the perspective of a criminal
defense attorney practicing within one such court. Part II briefly recounts
the history of U.S. drug policies leading to the advent of drug treatment
courts as an alternative to ordinary case processing by our courts. Part III
describes the development of the initial drug treatment court in Miami,
Florida, and the spread of drug courts throughout the country. It outlines
the methods through which these programs modify the traditional litiga-
tion-based playing field, introducing closer judicial supervision of criminal
defendants in less adversarial settings.
To demonstrate the need for drug court literature to adequately ad-
dress the legal and ethical concerns that may affect defense attorneys work-
ing in treatment courts, Part IV focuses on a recent article by drug court
proponents about these courts and their practices. I base my analysis upon
treat nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders," bringing total federal drug court grants
since 1995 to over $100 million). But see Eric Cohen, The Drug Court Revolution, WKLY.
STANDARD, Dec. 27, 1999, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/magazine/
mag_5_15_99/cohenfeat_5_15_99.html (questioning effectiveness of drug courts). See gen-
erally DECADE OF DRUG COURTS, supra note 1 (outlining accomplishments of drug treat-
ment courts).
5. See John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Drug Court in Miami, in TrE
EARLY DRUr COURTS, supra note 1, at 19 [hereinafter Goldkamp, Treatment Drug Court in
Miami] ("In 1999, there is a sizeable and increasingly accepted movement across the coun-
try to establish drug courts."); Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 440.
6. Most of the evaluations of these developments to date have been conducted from a
social work, psychology, therapy, and/or policy perspective and do not adequately address
the legal issues presented. See, e.g., Adele Harrell, Sharon Cavanagh & John Roma, Evalu-
ation of the D.C. Superior Court Drug Intervention Programs, REs. IN BRIEF (Nat'l Inst. of
Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2000, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/
courdocs2000.htm (reporting decrease in drug use and criminal activity among drug in-
volved defendants who participated in comprehensive treatment program); see also
Belenko, Critical Review, supra note 2, at 2 (finding that increased supervision and drug
testing in drug court program resulted in decrease in drug use and criminal activity). The
majority of the articles that significantly touch upon the legal and ethical implications of
drug court programs are largely theoretical. See infra Part IV.A; see, e.g., Richard C. Boldt,
Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205
(1998) (surveying history of rehabilitative models and discussing theoretical tensions in re-
lated literature). In addition, few articles about drug treatment courts are written from a
defense perspective or based upon the real experiences of practicing attorneys. But see, e.g.,
Lisa Schreibersdorf, The Pitfalls of Defenders as "Team Players," INDIGENT DEF., Nov./Dec.
1997, available at http://www.nlada.org/indig/nd97/Pitfall.htm (discussing erosion of adver-
sarial stance when defense attorneys become team players and counselors to their clients in
drug courts).
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my observations and experiences as a staff attorney with The Bronx De-
fenders7 representing clients in the Bronx Treatment Court.8 In particular,
Part IV considers an important issue largely unaddressed by other au-
thors-the role of defense attorneys at drug treatment court status hearings
in post-plea jurisdictions. It concludes that these phases of drug court pro-
ceedings must be regarded as critical stages of criminal prosecutions,
wherein a defendant's constitutional rights to effective assistance of coun-
sel and due process of law must be protected and maintained.
Based upon this discussion and analysis, Part V makes general sugges-
tions for the future of drug treatment courts and drug treatment court prac-
tice. Ongoing evaluation of these popular new models should include and
take into account the actual experiences of defense attorneys within the
courts. Without rigorous and honest assessment, drug treatment courts
cannot properly evolve and may have difficulty claiming legal legitimacy in
the twenty-first century.
II.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF RESPONSES TO DRUG-RELATED CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES
The history of drug regulation and crime in the United States is rela-
tively short.9 For decades, many substances now illegal were readily and
7. The Bronx Defenders is an alternative public defender office serving clients in
Bronx County, New York. The opinions expressed in this article are my own and not neces-
sarily those of The Bronx Defenders.
My initial interest in specialized courts and more specifically in drug treatment court
practices began when I served as an E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow at Georgetown Univer-
sity's Criminal Justice Clinic. As a Fellow, I represented clients in Washington, D.C., Supe-
rior Court during the implementation of its specialized domestic violence and drug courts.
Thereafter I clerked for the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, United States District Court,
Eastern District of New York. As Judge Weinstein's law clerk, I assisted the judge in his
researching and writing about the U.S. "drug war" policies and their effect on the criminal
justice system. Before joining The Bronx Defenders, I worked with the Center for Court
Innovation on its Justice Project, which sought to explore the implications of "problem-
solving" courts on the criminal justice system.
8. See discussion infra Part II. The Bronx Treatment Court was established in 1999 in
Bronx County, New York. It is a post-plea, felony drug treatment court, which means that
defendants are required to enter a guilty plea before they are allowed to take part in treat-
ment programs through the drug court. In some pre-plea or pre-adjudication jurisdictions,
prosecution is simply deferred while the defendant completes a drug treatment program.
See Belenko, Critical Review, supra note 2, at 5; Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scan-
dal, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1437, 1462 n.2 (2000).
9. For an excellent and extended discussion of the history of drug crime and drug pol-
icy in the United States, see Special Issue, The Drug Policy Debate, 28 FoRDHA,, URB. L.J.
1 (2000) [hereinafter The Drug Policy Debate] (including discussions by David F. Musto,
M.D., and others regarding past, present, and future U.S. drug policy). See also Hoffman,
supra note 8 (concluding that there is little evidence that drug courts reduce recidivism but
substantial evidence that they create profound operational and institutional problems); Jack
B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn, Some Reflections on the Federal Judicial Role During tie War
on Drugs, in THE JUDICIAL RoiE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (Sean Doran & John Jackson
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legally available in the United States and contained in a number of com-
mercial products.' Not until the late 1800s and early 1900s did many sub-
stances become "controlled" and criminalized by the government.1 The
Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914,12 passed in the wake of increased focus on
the relationship among crime, increased drug usage, and abuse,l3 marked
the federal government's entry into the world of drug control. 14 Prior to
the passage of the act, drugs were considered a medical concern left largely
to doctors, who could provide medications to patients as they saw fit.' 5 The
new law restricted distribution by requiring doctors to keep careful records
of their disbursements of medication and imposing fines upon those who
failed to comply.' 6
Through enforcement of the Harrison Act, the United States began to
develop a narcotics policy more concerned with control and punishment of
drug use than with public health. 7 In the years that followed, this prohibi-
tionist, punitive approach took firm root. The first American "drug czar,"
Harry Anslinger, was appointed to head the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(now the Drug Enforcement Administration),' and marijuana was added
to the list of substances "controlled" by American laws.' 9 Thus the nation's
law-enforcement model-premised on control and punishment-prevailed,
readily incorporating each new wave of popular drugs, from the 1920s to
the 1960s.2°
During the tumultuous decade of the 1960s when issues of drug sale,
use, and addiction commanded heightened national attention, the federal
eds., 2000) (examining history and effect of war against drugs in United States and sug-
gesting role that should be played by federal judges handling drug cases).
10. See The Drug Policy Debate, supra note 9, at 26-27 (discussing use of heroin in
Bayer company medications and cocaine in Coca-Cola).
11. See id. at 25-35; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 134-40 (1993) (discussing emergence of temperance movements and
drug laws during mid- to late-nineteenth century); JAMES A. INCIARDI, DUANE MCBRIDE &
JAMES RIVERS, DRUG CONTROL AND THE COURTS 1-5 (1996) (discussing late-nineteenth-
century criminalization of certain substances, particularly use and distribution of opium).
12. Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
13. See INCIARDI, McBRIDE & RIVERS, supra note 11, at 2.
14. Id.; see The Drug Policy Debate, supra note 9, at 28.
15. See The Drug Policy Debate, supra note 9, at 26-28.
16. See id. at 28.
17. See INCIARDI, McBRIDE & RIVERS, supra note 11, at 5; The Drug Policy Debate,
supra note 9, at 28.
18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 356; INCIARDI, McBRIDE & RIVERS, supra note 11, at
10.
19. Marijuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
20. See NoRMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 257 (1993); see also INCIARDI, McBRIDE & RIVERS, supra note 11, at 12
("Among the difficulties reflected in the research from the 1920s through the 1960s is the
static frame of reference in which addiction has been repeatedly perceived."); The Drug
Policy Debate, supra note 9, at 31 (quoting David F. Musto, M.D., stating, "when there was
a modest resurgence of heroin use in the 1950s, the federal response was to enact more
severe laws").
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government stepped up its drug control efforts.21 Feeding fears related to
widespread protest, rebellion, and drug use by U.S. youth, 2 President
Richard Nixon declared a "war on crime," promising to expand federal
drug control laws.23
During the same time period, however, the federal government di-
rected limited resources towards less punitive responses to drug use34 and
created a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.25 The federal
government also experimented with rehabilitative approaches to drug
crime, sponsoring programs that attempted to link the criminal justice sys-
tem and the treatment model. One of these, the Treatment Alternatives to
Street Crime (TASC) program, continues to exist today 2 6 Additional local
noncriminal alternatives for drug cases also sprang up throughout the
country in the 1960s and 1970s, diverting first-time drug offenders from the
criminal justice system into treatment programs2 7
Despite the more liberal, rehabilitative undercurrent of the 1960s and
1970s, the punitive approach towards most drug offenders continued on
many fronts38 For example, in 1973 in New York State, Governor Nelson
Rockefeller signed new drug sentencing laws still known for their draco-
nian treatment of drug offenders.29 By the 1980s a renewed federal "war
on drugs" was under way, with the creation of rigid sentencing guidelines
21. See INcLARDI, MCBRIME & RAVERS, supra note 11, at 36-38.
22. See id.
23. See 1&; see also Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)).
24. See The Drug Policy Debate, supra note 9, at 33 (noting that during 1960s, "Iv]ery
little national resources were put into anti-narcotic campaigns or treatment").
25. See Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug
Control Legislation, 2 DRUG ABUSE L. REv. 144, 172-74 (1972-73).
26. INcIr i, McBRiDE & RIVERS, supra note 11, at 36 ("Under TASC, community-
based supervision is made available to drug-involved individuals who would otherwise bur-
den the justice system with their persistent drug-associated criminality."). For a more in-
depth discussion of TASC and its history, see id. at 35-60.
27. See, e.g., id. at 38 (noting that TASC's first diversion programs operated in Dela-
ware and Pennsylvania); see also SEmTcING RExomi IN OVERCROwDED TIMES 3
(Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997) (noting that "American reformers in the
1970s called for creation of fairer, more principled policies") [hereinafter SErTcING RE-
FoRm]. See generally S. ANTHONY McCANN, NAT'L Assoc. or COUTIES RE~scA
FOUND., LOCAL ALTERNATIVES TO ARREST, INCARCERATION, AND ADJUDICATION (1976)
(copy on file with author) (describing alternatives to incarceration for drug offenders); Tom
S. Allison, San Joaquin County-Outside Evaluator's Report on the "Drug Client Offender
Diversion Project" (1974) (unpublished report, on file with author) (discussing and evaluat-
ing diversion program for first time drug offenders in San Joaquin County, California).
28. See W. Clinton Terry III, Judicial Change and Dedicated Treatment Courts: Case
Studies in Innovation, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS, supra note 1, at 3 [hereinafter Terry,
Judicial Change] ("In 1981, President Reagan abandoned the government's reliance on
treatment and prevention in favor of strengthening law enforcement efforts.").
29. See, e.g., INcIARDI, McBIDE & RIvERs, supra note 11, at 67 ("[Vlirtual emergency
strategies... were necessary to deal with the massive number of arrests following enact-
ment of the harsh so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws."); David C. Leven, Our Drug Laws
Have Failed-So Where Is the Desperately Needed Meaningjld Reform, 28 FoRarN-t URB.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
2000-2001]
42 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
and mandatory-minimum sentences for drug offenses on the national
level.3 °
While Presidents Reagan and Bush spent billions of dollars on drug
control efforts and narcotics enforcement both within our borders and
outside of the country,3' tremendous numbers of Americans, many of them
addicts, still committed narcotics-related crimes and became entangled in
the criminal justice system. "Drug war" tactics were widely criticized for
failing to prevent the horrors caused by drug abuse. On the local level,
instead of solving the criminal justice system's problems, the tough tactics
simply added to them. For instance, the various institutions engaged in
dealing with drug offenders faltered under the heavy burden of dealing
with the tremendous number of defendants passing through the courthouse
doors. Criminal court dockets became overloaded, prisons became over-
crowded, and attorneys on both sides of the equation faced growing
caseloads.33
One localized response3 4 to the enormous number of drug cases flood-
ing the system was an attempt to move narcotics matters more quickly.35
Another was to create specialized courts which handled only drug of-
fenses.36 However, neither expedited case processing efforts nor dedicated
drug courts ameliorated the problem of overcrowding in prisons and jails. 37
L.J. 293, 293 (2000) ("[T]he Rockefeller drug laws... have filled our prisons with thousands
of non-violent addicts who are unjustifiably denied drug treatment alternatives.").
30. See generally The Drug Policy Debate, supra note 9; Symposium, The Sentencing
Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War on Dngs, 40 VILL. L. REv. 301 (1995)
(analyzing history and wisdom of sentencing guidelines).
31. See DRUG TRAFICKING IN THE AMERICAS 2-3 (Bruce M. Bagley & William 0.
Walker III eds., 1996); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE "DRUG WAR" IN COLOMBIA: TIE
NEGLECTED TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 129-36 (1990); Ethan Nadelmann, Com-
mon Sense Drug Policy, 77 FOREIGN Am. 111, 111 (1998).
32. See The Drug Policy Debate, supra note 9, at 56 (quoting Eric Sterling, President of
the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, stating that "[a] CBS News poll from October 1996
revealed that 78% of the public believed the war on drugs had failed"). Organizations such
as Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) and the Lindesmith Center became
vocal critics of rigid, drug war practices. Individuals working within the criminal justice
system also fought hard to oppose draconian drug sentencing laws. Indeed, for a period of
time U.S. District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York re-
fused to handle any drug cases given the harshness of the federal sentencing guidelines and
mandatory-minimum sentences. See Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 457 n.84.
33. See SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 1, at 2; DECADE OF DRUG COURTS, supra
note 1, at 2; Boldt, supra note 6, at 1207; Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 456-62.
34. The federal courts, still controlled by federal sentencing guidelines, have been
largely uninvolved in the drug treatment court movement. This is interesting given that the
Department of Justice supervises prosecuting attorneys in federal courts while simultane-
ously funding much of the drug court activity on the state level.
35. See CAROLINE COOPER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EXPEDITED DRUG CASE MANAGEMENT (1994), http://www.ncjrs/txtfiles/exdc.txt; see also
SPECIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 1 (describing differences between specialized drug
treatment courts and courts that simply provide differentiated case management of drug
cases).
36. Terry, Judicial Change, supra note 28, at 4.
37. Goldkamp, Treatment Drug Court in Miami, supra note 5, at 22.
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Finally, one jurisdiction moved beyond attempts to simply process drug
cases more efficiently, initiating a program to deal with the "root causes" of
drug-related crime-drug abuse and addiction-by integrating drug treat-
ment with traditional case processing.38 Thus, a specialized drug treatment
court in Miami, Florida-said to be the first of its kind 39  was developed
in 1989.40
iI.
DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION
OF THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT MODEL
A. Miami Drug Court: America's First Treatment Court
The Miami Drug Court targeted only persons arrested for fist-time,
relatively low-level, felony drug offenses.41 These individuals had their
cases diverted from the traditional adjudication path if they agreed to par-
ticipate in long-term, outpatient drug treatment.42 Upon successful com-
pletion of treatment, defendants were rewarded with dismissal of their
cases. 43
This program was considered innovative because, unlike earlier reha-
bilitative efforts within the criminal justice system, the court did not rely on
outside actors such as parole or probation officers to find programs and
monitor defendants in treatment. 44 Rather, Miami Drug Court involved an
active judge who was integrally involved with a defendant's treatment from
beginning to end.45
38. Id. at 27-32; see also John S. Goldkamp, Challenges for Research and Innovation:
When Is a Drug Court Not a Drug Court?, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS, supra note 1, at
166-67 [hereinafter Goldkamp, When Is a Drug Court Not a Drug Court?] (describing crea-
tion of treatment drug court in Miami, Florida).
39. As already noted, some specialized drug courts did exist prior to the 1980s. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text. During the 1970s New York City created specialized
drug courts in response to the growing number of drug cases under the Rockefeller Drug
Laws. See NcLRaui, McBRIDE & RIVERS, supra note 11, at 68; Belenko, Critical Review
supra note 2, at 4; SPECIAL DRUG CouRTs, supra note 1, at 4.
40. See generally Goldkamp, Treatment Drug Court in Miami, supra note 5 (describing
creation of drug treatment court in Miami that was premised on notion of reducing crime
and criminal caseload by involving offenders in drug treatment).
41. See Bennett H. Brummer, Independent, Professional Judgment: The Essence of
Freedom, 10 ST. THOMiAS L. REV. 607, 611 n.18 (1998) (explaining how Miami's drug court
differs from traditional courts).
42. The treatment program lasted approximately one year. See Goldkamp, Treatment
Drug Court in Miami, supra note 5, at 26.
43. See SPEcIAL DRUG COURTS, supra note 1, at 4.
44. INct.mxi, McBRDE & RIrVES, supra note 11, at 67 ("Rather than relying on orga-
nizations such as TASC or probation to identify, assess, refer, and monitor drug-using of-
fenders, drug court judges act as case managers."); Terry, Judicial Change, supra note 28, at
7 ("[B]y bringing treatment into the courtroom, an effort is made to modify offenders' sub-
stance-abusing behavior.").
45. See Goldkamp, Treatment Drug Court in Miami, supra note 5, at 24--25.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
2000-2001]
44 N.Y U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
After pleading guilty and having their sentences deferred while they
participated in the program, defendants were required to report to the pre-
siding judge for frequent case updates.46 At each update the treatment
agency provided the court with information regarding the defendant's pro-
gress and participation.47 The judge and defendant directly discussed the
defendant's program status.48 If a defendant was doing fairly well, the
court encouraged her to continue to comply with the treatment regime. On
the other hand, the court would sanction a defendant who was doing poorly
in treatment or violating drug court rules.49 Sanctions intensified with re-
peated violations, some involving periods of incarceration of up to fourteen
days.5
The dramatic change in the judge's role from passive arbiter to hands-
on treatment monitor drastically affected the courtroom dynamic for all
players in the system. As Professor John Goldkamp wrote in a review of
the Miami Drug Court:
The unusual role of the judge... is best understood in the context
of the unorthodox, nonadversarial, and team-oriented roles
played by the other criminal justice officials in the courtroom,
roles designed to support the judge's role and contribute to the
treatment progress of the drug-involved felony defendants coming
through the court.... Most noticeable are the transformed roles
of the prosecutor and defender. 1
Indeed, the defense attorneys of the Miami Drug Court reportedly played a
role that was "more therapeutic in nature than adversarial."52
B. Proliferation of Drug Treatment Courts:
Federal Encouragement of the Treatment Model in the States
After the creation of the Miami Drug Court, interest in drug treatment
courts specifically, 3 and the integration of treatment into the traditional
judicial process generally,54 grew tremendously. Many people, including a
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 25.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Katherine E. Finkelstein, New York to Offer Most Addicts Treatment In-
stead of Jail Terms, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2000, at Al (reporting New York State's plan for
treatment programs for nonviolent drug addicts); see also Goldkamp, When Is a Drug Court
Not a Drug Court?, supra note 38, at 168 (noting that "drug court movement spread quickly
because [of] the Miami innovation," resulting in greater inclusion of treatment into tradi-
tional criminal process).
54. See, e.g., DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE FACT SHEET (June 1998) [hereinafter
FACT SHEET], available at http:l/www.ojpusdoj.gov/dcpo/facts98.htm (reporting that in
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 26:37
DRUG TREATMENT COURT PRACTICE
large number of defense attorneys, welcomed the possibility of providing
court-sponsored treatment to drug offenders as opposed to more punitive
alternatives. 55 Surprisingly, the federal government seemed to play a much
larger role in spreading the word about drug treatment courts than the de-
fense bar did.
To assist in the implementation and funding of the vast number of lo-
cal drug treatment courts that were developing throughout the country, the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) established a Drug Courts Program Of-
fice in 1995.56 As part of this federal initiative, the Drug Courts Program
Office in cooperation with the National Association of Drug Court Profes-
sionals published in 1997 a well-known report entitled Defining Dng
Courts: The Key ComponentsY The report outlined important features
successful drug courts should have, based on the experiences of the drug
court "pioneers." '58 Requirements included integration of treatment ser-
vices with traditional case processing, prompt placement of eligible defend-
ants into treatment, and close monitoring of defendant drug use by the
1998, at least forty-three juvenile and family drug courts operated in United States); Bar-
bara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law:
A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL L REv. 469 (1998); Brummer,
supra note 41, at 624 (1998) (discussing emergence of other specialized criminal courts, in-
cluding treatment-based teen smoking courts).
55. See Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n, Defenders Largely Satisfied wilh Drug
Court Experience, INDIGENT DEF. (NovJDec. 1997), available at http:/wAv.nlada.orgindig/
nd97/Dcexper.htm. Certainly most defense attorneys would support a forum that allows for
treatment rather than incarceration for addicted clients-a standard characterization of
drug courts. See; e.g., John Feinblatt, Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, Institutionalizing Inno-
vation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FoRDHAm UR. LJ. 277,278 (2000) (describing
New York's drug treatment courts as "specialized courtrooms that take problem-solving
approach to addiction, linking nonviolent defendants to long-term, judicially-supervised
drug treatment instead of incarceration"). Interestingly, it seems that those who are ap-
proved for participation in drug court, at least in the Bronx, would not always have received
a sentence of incarceration prior to the inception of the drug court. Indeed, as will be
addressed further in this article, drug court clients in the Bronx are first-time felony offend-
ers. See infra note 140. It is my understanding that prior to the creation of the drug court,
such defendants often received plea offers that involved a sentence of probation, not
incarceration.
56. FAcr SHEEr, supra note 54. For consideration of the federal government's decision
to involve itself in local drug policy and court administration when almost no federal drug
courts exist, see Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1464 n.115.
57. DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMIS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS (1997) [hereinafter KEY Comt.
PoErNcrs], available at http'/lwww.ojp.usdoj.govldcpolDefinedfdpdf.pdf.
58. There are ten key components in all:
(1) Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice
system case processing.
(2) Using a nonadversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote
public safety while protecting participants' due process rights.
(3) Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug
court program.
(4) Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related
treatment and rehabilitation services.
(5) Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing.
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judge.59 Thereafter, the DOJ conditioned funding of new drug courts on
their being designed "in accordance with the ten key components. ' '6 As of
1999, under the auspices of the DOJ, nearly 400 drug courts61 of varying
shapes and sizes6" operated across the country. One such institution, lo-
cated in the jurisdiction where I practice, is the Bronx Treatment Court.
C. Suggested Role for Defense Counsel in Drug Treatment Courts
Beyond merely providing basic parameters for drug treatment courts
to observe, DOJ's Key Components also places particular requirements
upon defense attorneys working within such institutions, carving out the
role counsel should play. It indicates that all attorneys practicing in drug
treatment courts should "shed their traditional adversarial courtroom rela-
tionship and work together as a team."63
(6) A coordinated strategy governs drug court responses to participants'
compliance.
(7) Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court participant is essential.
(8) Monitoring and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and
gauge effectiveness.
(9) Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court plan-
ning, implementation, and operation.
(10) Forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-
based organizations generates local support and enhances drug court
effectiveness.
Id.
59. See id. at 12, 16, 22. An analysis of the drug treatment court judge as active moni-
tor is beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, this "new" role for judges may be viewed as
analogous to the judge's role first developed under the public law litigation model, used by
courts since the 1960s to remediate ongoing social problems by looking beyond the tradi-
tional trial-focused litigation. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1, at 835 n.7.
60. FAcT SHEET, supra note 54. As of 1998, 270 jurisdictions had received a total of
$47 million in DOJ grants to plan, implement, or improve drug treatment courts. Id.
61. Office of Justice Programs, Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance
Project, Drug Court Activity Update: Summary Information (June 1999) at http://www.
american.edulacademic.depts/spaljustice/publications/decadein.htm (also reporting that ap-
proximately 140,000 defendants had enrolled in such courts).
62. Some courts deal only with felony drug cases, others take on only misdemeanors,
and a few deal with both. There are also variations in the types of dispositions required for
treatment involvement. Some courts hold prosecution in abeyance until completion of
treatment or failure, allowing "failing" defendants to proceed to trial thereafter. A number
of other courts require defendants to enter guilty pleas prior to entering drug rehabilitation
programs. In these jurisdictions, defendants are usually allowed to withdraw their guilty
pleas altogether, or alternatively to plead guilty to reduced charges, upon their successful
completion of treatment. Some commentators refer to this latter type of drug treatment
court as a "postadjudication" model. See, e.g., Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at
515 (comparing "preadjudicative" and "postadjudicative" models). This is a bit of a misno-
mer, since formal judgment or adjudication is not possible until after a sentence is imposed.
Therefore, to avoid confusion, this article will refer to such courts as post-plea models.
63. KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 57.
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Some commentators, particularly members and former members of
the judiciary, have been quick to praise and promote a nonadversarial ap-
proach in drug treatment courts.64 For instance, a recent article by John
T.A. Rosenthal and Judges Peggy Fulton Hora and William G. Schma, dis-
cussed at greater length below, explained that "the DTC [drug treatment
court] defense attorney must also put aside her adversarial mindset and
engage in the collaborative efforts of the treatment team .... With the
consent of the defendant the goal becomes recovery from addiction and
not the exercise of the full panoply of the defendant's rights. '6S In an inter-
view with the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA),
Judge Jeffrey S. Tauber, former presiding judge for the Oakland, Califor-
nia, drug treatment court,66 explained:
Defenders need to look at this as a new approach that requires a
level of team work and partnership that is not often seen. It re-
quires defenders to take a step back, to not intervene actively be-
tween the judge and the participant, and allow that relationship to
develop and do its work, and basically to understand the impor-
tance of working within a team concept.67
Even the State of New York's Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye has promoted a"shift away from the adversary model towards a team-based, problem-solv-
ing approach" for treatment-based proceedings. Her support for such a
shift has resulted in the creation of many treatment-based courts in New
York, including the Bronx Treatment Court, as well as a promise of more
to come.69
64. But see Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1477 (criticizing drug treatment court movement,
in part, for "enabling our continued national schizophrenia about drugs"). Perhaps other
judges favor the new model because the Department of Justice recommends that in such
courts judges should be permitted to step beyond their "traditionally independent and ob-
jective arbiter roles" to become "the leader of the drug court team." KIEY CompoNENrs,
supra note 57.
65. Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 479-0.
66. Judge Tauber became Director of the National Drug Court Institute (NDCI), an
organization sponsored by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of
the President, and the Drug Courts Program Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. De-
partment of Justice. NDCI's stated mission is "[p]romoting education, research and scholar-
ship for drug court and other court-based intervention programs." Nat'l Drug Court Inst.,
About NDCI, at http://www.ndci.orglaboutndci.htm.
67. Scott Wallace, A Level of Teamwork Not Often Seen: An Interview with Judge Jef-
frey S. Tauber, INMIGENT DEF., NovJDec. 1997, available at httpi/wvv.nlada.orgindig/
nd97/Tauber.htm.
68. Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 For!w-i~ L RE%. 1, 5
(1998) ("The lawyers also have new roles. The prosecution and defense are not sparring
champions, they are members of a team with a common goal: getting the defendant off
drugs.").
69. See Feinblatt, Berman & Fox, supra note 55, at 292 (noting proposal to institute
drug courts and their principles in every jurisdiction within New York State).
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D. Bronx Treatment Court
Established in March 1999, the Bronx Treatment Court was intended
to provide an "innovative approach to the processing of drug abusing de-
fendants charged for the first time with felony sale or possession of con-
trolled substances."7 As "a joint effort of representatives from the court
system, the Bronx District Attorney's Office, the Bronx Legal Aid Soci-
ety,"'" and treatment providers, the Bronx Treatment Court's stated goal is
to provide "instead of jail... intensive long term treatment for drug and
alcohol abusers under close court supervision.""2
Defendants who are nineteen years of age or older, with no prior fel-
ony or violent crime convictions, and no prior felony probation sentences,
are potentially eligible for assessment by the Bronx Treatment Court.73 In
addition, to qualify for diversion to the court for screening, defendants
must be charged with certain enumerated felony drug offenses-including
most crimes relating to drug sale or possession with intent to distribute
drugs.74 Specifically, defendants charged with violating New York Penal
Code sections 220.06 (criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
fifth degree), 220.09 (criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
fourth degree), 220.16 (criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
third degree), 220.34 (criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth
degree), 220.39 (criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree)
or any felony level section 221 charge (offense involving marijuana) are
potentially eligible for drug court placement.75
Defendants who fit this description have their cases routed early in the
criminal process to the Bronx Treatment Court for further evaluation. Any
attorney, including private counsel, the Legal Aid Society, or The Bronx
Defenders, may represent defendants referred to the treatment court.
Once a case reaches the drug treatment court, often within a few days
of the defendant's arrest and arraignment, drug court staff interviews the
defendant to determine her need for drug or alcohol treatment. If the staff
decides that a defendant is an appropriate candidate for rehabilitation and
70. BRONX TREATMENT COURT, WELCOME TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT 5
(1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter WELCOME TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2. Thus the Bronx Treatment Court considers itself an "alternative to incar-
ceration" program. BRONX TREATMENT COURT, YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREATMENT
COURT 1 (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREAT-
MENT COURT]. But see supra note 55.
73. Eligible defendants may have previously been sentenced to a term of felony proba-
tion if they were adjudicated youthful offenders for a felony offense. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.02 (McKinney 2001).
74. YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 72, at 1-2. Those
charged with drug felonies related to alleged activity on or near a school ground, see N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 220.44, or A-level felony drug crimes, see, e.g., id. § 220.18, are generally
ineligible. See YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 72, at 1-2.
75. See YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 72, at 8-9.
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drug court participation, she may avail herself of a drug court plea offer,
assuming one is made by the Office of the District Attorney.
The plea offer generally provides that if a defendant pleads guilty to
the most serious crime with which she is charged, she will be permitted to
enter into long term treatment.76 As part of the plea agreement, the defen-
dant must comply with all drug court rules, allow the release of confidential
information relating to treatment progress to the court, prosecutor, defense
counsel, and drug court staff, and waive her right to appeal.77
Upon successful completion of the mandated program, a defendant
may withdraw her felony guilty plea.78 Thereafter, she pleads guilty to a
misdemeanor, or in special cases, she may have her case dismissed en-
tirely.7 9 For those who do not successfully complete treatment, the court
imposes the sentence promised under the plea agreement, usually two to
six years of incarceration.80 Failure to complete treatment occurs if the
defendant is arrested and indicted for new felony drug charges, a violent
offense, or is expelled from the program.8'
The court generally offers treatment lasting for twelve to eighteen
months, during which a defendant attends an outpatient program for ap-
proximately twenty hours per week.' Treatment providers supply the
court with information about the participant on an ongoing basis through
written progress reports and other communications.83 A defendant, usually
accompanied by a program representative, must appear before the court
for frequent case updates or status hearings. s4
At case updates, the court praises defendants who are doing well, con-
gratulates them for their accomplishments, and encourages their continued
success in the program. Indeed, positive updates are an uplifting experi-
ence, many punctuated with applause for the defendant by everyone pre-
sent in the court. On the other hand, defendants who are not doing so
well-such as those who have relapsed, failed to attend all program meet-
ings, or broken other drug treatment court rules-can be sanctioned. Thus,
the Bronx Treatment Court employs DOJ's Key Components by integrating
treatment services with case processing, placing eligible defendants into
treatment quickly, and closely monitoring their compliance.
76. See BRoNx TRErAirNr COURT BROCHURE, BRONx TEA_ 'l r COURT CuEN-r
INFORMATION GUIDE 2 (1999) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter BRONX TRErATN"r
COURT CLIENT INFORMATION GUIDE].
77. Id at 3.
78. Id at 2.
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id at 5.
82. Id. at 2-3.
83. See Your GumE TO THE BRONX TRE-i-mEr COURT, supra note 72, at 4.
84. See id.
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IV.
DOES THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT MODEL COMPORT
wITH EXISTING LEGAL AND ETHICAL STANDARDS
FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS?
While DOJ's Key Components for attorneys practicing in drug treat-
ment courts suggests a new role for defense attorneys, it does not cite any
accompanying modification of prevailing constitutional, legal, or other ethi-
cal guidelines by which defense counsel are bound. In fact, DOJ's report
makes only passing mention of any legal standard relating to defendant
representation, stating that by "[u]sing a nonadversarial approach, prosecu-
tion and defense counsel promote public safety while protecting partici-
pants' due process rights."85 In the absence of legal grounding, one is left
to wonder how practitioners are supposed to square drug treatment court
principles with already existing mandates of the U.S. Constitution, state
statutes, and relevant codes of professional responsibility.
Defense attorneys have a duty to ask questions about suggested
changes in practice that may affect their clients.8 6 Common sense suggests,
and professional responsibility dictates, that before the defense bar can be
expected to take on a new role, open and meaningful examination of ex-
isting legal and ethical rules pertaining to the representation of criminal
defendants must occur in light of the suggested new role.87 Indeed, as part
of its Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation,
NLADA explained:
Stating that ethical and professional obligations apply to counsel
engaged in criminal defense may appear to be a restatement of
the obvious. However, increasing political, economic and social
pressures on the criminal justice system have led to demands that
defense attorneys act as "team players," i.e., to keep the system
85. KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 57, at 14.
86. Attorneys as professionals are not simply relegated to making objections and
presenting arguments in a courtroom. Indeed, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
note that "[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCr pmbl. (1983). It is every attorney's duty to "seek improvement of the law, the
administration of justice and the quality of serviced rendered by the legal profession" and to
utilize her specialized knowledge "in reform of the law." Id.
87. See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N (NLADA), PERFORMANCE GUIDE-
LINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 1.1 (1997) ("Attorneys... have an obli-
gation to abide by ethical norms and act in accordance with the rules of the court."). The
NLADA guidelines are not binding on defense attorneys but are intended "to provide gui-
dance to criminal defense attorneys (by identifying potential options, actions and relevant
considerations) for the purpose of ensuring that all defendants receive the zealous and qual-
ity representation that should be their right." Id. at Introduction.
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functioning even at the expense of individual clients. While de-
fense counsel may remain sensitive to system difficulties... coun-
sel must not compromise the representation of counsel's own
client when seeking to ameliorate such difficulties.8
While NLADA's comments do not seem to be aimed specifically at
drug treatment court practice, they serve as a reminder that thoughtful
evaluation should precede any accepted change in role for defense attor-
neys. The fact that drug courts already operate in counties across the coun-
try and continue to be replicated does not mitigate this necessity. Thus,
since we currently find ourselves more than a decade into the drug court
movement, critical analysis of the suggested "team work" approach must
be undertaken both in light of proposals that have been made by propo-
nents of such models, as well as the practices that have evolved in the
courts.
A. The Question of How to Respond to the Question
The question of whether the drug treatment court model comports
with existing legal and ethical mandates is, at best, difficult to answer.8 9
For one thing, as discussed above, each individual drug court has developed
separately and implemented its own version of the treatment-based model.
While nearly all espouse the tenets set out in the DOJ's Key Components,
almost every jurisdiction presents a slightly different variation on the same
theme. Thus generalizations are difficult to make and may in fact lead to
incorrect conclusions. It is important, therefore, that drug court critiques
ask not only whether drug court principles in theory raise constitutional or
other concerns, but also if they do in practice.
It should be further noted that some attempts to address the legal and
ethical implications of drug treatment courts are underway. 0 To date,
88. Id. § 1.1 cmt.
89. The legality of treatment court practices is an issue one might expect the judiciary
to eventually reach via appellate review. It may take some time before a substantial num-
ber of cases testing drug treatment court policies percolate up though the appellate process,
however, particularly in jurisdictions like the Bronx where defendants are required to waive
their right to appeal in order to accept a drug court plea offer.
In addition, decisions relating to drug treatment court practices and procedures might
more appropriately be made through the legislative process. Cf Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 401-02
(1998) (discussing how experimentalism in courts features judges involving social actors in
remedial plans).
90. See, e.g., NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., FEDERAL CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS AND How
THEY AFFECr DRUG COURT PRAcrriNors, at Conclusion n.2 (1999) (hereinafter FED.
ERAL CoNwnENITLrr LAWS) ("The National Drug Court Institute ... is in the process of
developing a comprehensive treatise on confidentiality and ethical issues confronting all
practitioners in drug courts .... NDCI plans to publish the comprehensive treatise in the
fall of 2000, which will provide information to all disciplines."). The Center for Court Inno-
vation, in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice and the Open Society Institute,
"has conducted a series of discussions about problem-solving courts, looking at how they
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however, little written analysis based on actual experiences in the drug
courts and in light of prevailing legal and ethical norms has been under-
taken of the proposed shift in role for defense attorneys.9 Most of the
literature regarding drug treatment courts is relatively abstract 92 or fails to
adequately explore the issue of whether the drug court model comports
with legal and ethical standards for defense attorneys in day-to-day prac-
tice. 3 To demonstrate this point, and to provide a starting point for a
broader discussion about the propriety of treatment court practice, I will
analyze a recent article concerning drug treatment courts, Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the
Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America,94
in light of my experience in the Bronx Treatment Court.
B. Response to the "Therapeutic Jurisprudential" Response
In Drug Treatment Court Movement, Judges Peggy Fulton Hora and
William G. Schma along with John T.A. Rosenthal (hereinafter "the au-
thors") have written one of the most in-depth articles about drug treatment
courts to date. Unfortunately, although the article is an important contri-
bution to treatment court discourse, it does little to adequately address the
question of whether such institutions raise ethical or legal issues for de-
fense practitioners.
For instance, with regard to the transition a defense attorney must un-
dergo to practice in the drug court, the authors state: "In stark contrast to
the traditional role of a defense counsel to minimize a client's exposure to
depart from standard case processing in the state courts and how they have affected the
roles of judges and. attorneys." CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnova
tion.org/reflection.html. See also What Is a Traditional Judge Anyway: Problem Solving in
the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78 (2000) (consisting of transcript of discussion among
judges, attorneys, policy makers, and scholars convened by Center for Court Innovation to
talk about "problem-solving" courts, including drug treatment courts). Thus the existing"movement" to evaluate the drug treatment courts is largely being led by those who create
and/or sustain such institutions.
91. See, e.g, Alternatives to Incarceration for Drug-Abusing Offenders, 111 HARv. L.
REV. 1898, 1918 (1998) (noting that "drug courts create potentially serious conflicts of inter-
est for defense attorneys"); Boldt, supra note 6 (concluding that minimum requirements for
responsible defense practice in drug treatment courts are unlikely to be met on consistent
basis); Robert Burke, Reconciling Drug Court Participation with Defender Ethical Stan-
dards, INDIGENT DEF., Nov./Dec. 1997 (suggesting ways in which defenders can utilize and
play effective role in drug courts without diminishing independence or ability to provide
representation). See generally Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L.
REv. 1437 (2000) (illustrating problems resulting from drug treatment courts, based on ex-
periences and perspectives of judge).
92. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 1, at 837 (arguing that drug treatment courts, as"experimentalist" institutions involving complex ensemble of actors, are one way of moving
beyond traditional legal paradigm).
93. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
94. Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2.
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criminal sanctions, the DTC defense attorney tries to ensure that the ad-
dicted defendant stays in the treatment program until graduation."95 They
go on to explain:
Actions by defense counsel may include, after full disclosure to
the client, foregoing legal defense tactics such as motions to sup-
press evidence, which might delay the process or prevent the de-
fendant from accepting responsibility for drug use. These actions
might also include counseling a defendant to disclose continued
drug use (relapse) in order to foster honesty and reduce the barri-
ers to effective drug treatment.96
This advice is provided without meaningful analysis of the proposed
courses of action in light of constitutional and ethical standards.
Instead, the authors urge attorneys to examine drug courts through the
lens of therapeutic jurisprudence, 97 which is interested in the "'sociop-
sychological ways' in which laws and legal processes affect individuals in-
volved in our legal system.19 8  They suggest that using such a filter,
attorneys will conclude drug treatment court practices are just and proper
regardless of any proposed changes in roles or procedures. They claim that
treatment courts, unlike traditional criminal courts, work to further the
"best interest" of defendants, which is sobriety. Thus, the authors imply
ignorance or naivet6 on the part of defense attorneys99 who question the
legality of drug court practices. 100
This is not to say that the authors completely ignore the dilemmas cre-
ated by the drug court model. Indeed, they admit that treatment courts
95. Id. at 479.
96. Id.
97. The question of what constitutes therapeutic jurisprudence, by itself, presents
somewhat of a quandary. See id at 444 (stating that "[t]herapeutic jurisprudence is the
study of the role of law as therapeutic agent... [and] suggests that society should utilize the
theories, philosophies, and findings of various disciplines and fields of study to help shape
the development of the law") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Most defense attorneys grapple on a daily basis with the notion of seeking "thera-
peutic" outcomes for our clients. See, eg., Keri A. Gould, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Analysis of Competency Evaluation Requests: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 18 Ir'L
J.L. & PsYcHIA-rY 83 (1995) (discussing conflicts between ethical, strategic, and therapeu-
tic considerations in decision to request competency examination of criminal defendant);
David E. Rovella, The Best Defense, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31,2000, at Al (discussing concept of
holistic advocacy on behalf of clients).
100. Regardless of the "lens" of therapeutic jurisprudence, the drug treatment court
model still must be evaluated in light of prevailing constitutional, statutory, and ethical re-
quirements. Therapeutic jurisprudence is merely a construct within the law, and not any
kind of independent legal precept that must be followed. Accordingly, it cannot be used as
a method to evade requirements under the law. Moreover, is it not a defense attorney's
"therapeutic jurisprudential" obligation to inquire whether certain drug court practices are
perceived by clients as confusing or too invasive, which in turn may affect our ethical obliga-
tions towards such clients? See generally Boldt, supra note 6 (arguing that responsible advo-
cacy in drug courts requires resistance to therapeutic approaches where such approaches
conflict with client interests).
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present certain issues,101 particularly for defense attorneys moving from the
role of traditional advocate to that of "team-player." Nevertheless, the au-
thors reject rather quickly the potential legal and ethical concerns raised by
this transition, implying that anyone who continues to have serious ques-
tions about the long-term implications of drug treatment court practice is
simply missing the point.10 2
To demonstrate that greater discussion should occur around these im-
portant questions, I address five "role of the defense" issues that Hora,
Schma, and Rosenthal outlined and dismissed in their article.'0 3
1. Waiving the Rights of the Defendant
First, the authors suggest defense attorneys may be troubled by having
to waive certain rights on behalf of their clients in order for them to partici-
pate in a drug treatment program.1o They give at least two answers for
this quandary. On the one hand, they assert treatment court participation
is fully voluntary and therefore any defendant wishing to explore his full
range of rights simply need not participate. 10 5 On the other hand they
claim the waiver of rights required in drug treatment courts is "no more
onerous, and may actually be less imposing, than those required of other
criminal defendants," in, for example, the plea bargaining context.10 6
The authors are correct that defendants often waive important rights
in order to obtain some other benefit. 0 7 In practice, examples of such
waivers abound. 108 Generally, however, a waiver of rights by a defendant
101. See Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 506 ("Several key questions must
be answered for a DTC to operate efficiently while promoting and safeguarding the commu-
nity values it is entrusted to enforce."). The authors list ten sets of issues raised by such
courts: (1) program eligibility, (2) the structure of the program, (3) sources of funding, (4)
whether to create a pre- or post-adjudicative model, (5) the role of the prosecutor, (6) the
role of the defense attorney, (7) the role of the judge, (8) concerns on the part of treatment
providers regarding forced treatment, (9) how to properly quantify success rate, and (10)
cost effectiveness. Id. at 506-21.
102. Criticism targeted defense attorneys and prosecutors alike. See, e.g., Hora, Schma
& Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 520 ("[M]ost prosecutors have viewed DTC's through the
lenses of inappropriate jurisprudential theories.").
103. See also Robert Burke, Reconciling Drug Court Participation with Defender Etli-
cal Standards, INDIGENT DEF., Nov./Dec. 1997, http://www.nlada.org/indig/nd97/Reconc.htm
(discussing ways defense attorneys can comply with basic obligations to provide zealous
effective advocacy within drug court system).
104. Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 521.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Providing an example, the authors note a defendant who wishes to be sentenced
to probation. Probationers are generally subject to warrantless searches by probation of-
ficers. Thus, to gain the bargain of probation, they must give up their right to privacy to
some degree. See id. at 521 n.453.
108. Defendants who accept reduced plea offers usually give up a hefty list of rights,
including the rights to file suppression motions, to have a jury hear their case, to confront
the government's witnesses against them, to present witnesses on their own behalf, and to
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must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently to be legally cogni-
zable.1"9 This presents a unique set of issues for attorneys in the drug treat-
ment court setting, a relatively new territory lacking formal procedures.
One such issue is the problem of knowing what, exactly, the client re-
ceives in return for waiving her rights when she enters the drug court
plea.110 For a client who pleads guilty in treatment court, the defense attor-
ney may not be able to provide the same definitive answers she would for
the client accepting a plea offer in a traditional courtroom. 1' This is par-
ticularly true in jurisdictions that do not provide explicit contracts to clients
setting forth the parameters of the treatment agreement by way of a sanc-
tions schedule.'" A simple explanation that a judge will oversee treatment
and impose sanctions for failure to comply, potentially including short peri-
ods of incarceration, will satisfy the basic concerns of many clients, many of
whom are anxious to receive treatment. Nevertheless, this knowledge
alone may not be sufficient for a truly knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
choice among options when the range of unknowns is potentially broad." 3
Without knowing with certainty all that a treatment modality and regime of
sanctioning entails, the attorney may not be able to assist meaningfully a
drug court client considering a guilty plea.114
testify. Cf. Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 674 (D.C. 1991) (holding that right to
testify is "fundamental and personal right which can only be waived by the defendant").
109. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Boyd, 586 A.2d at 675.
110. Those who agree to participate in drug court treatment programs prior to trial or
guilty plea may face other legal and ethical issues, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
See Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 513-16.
111. The authors write that prior to the time a defendant enters a treatment court plea,
the defense attorney should make sure that "the defendant understands the nature of his or
her legal rights, the requirements of the program, and the possible legal consequences
should the defendant fail to complete the program." Id. at 479.
112. The Bronx Treatment Court makes available to attorneys a rather elaborate
"Sanctions Chart," which sets forth a "framework" for the imposition of sanctions, as part
of a brochure explaining the features of the treatment program. See YOUR GUIDE TO THE
BRONX TRE7ATMENT COURT, supra note 72, at 9. However, the chart is not intended to
provide an absolute formula for sanctions since "[t]he Judge maintains complete discretion
in the imposition of all sanctions." Id. On the other hand, some jurisdictions provide de-
fendants with detailed sanction schedules in long and confusing drug court contracts. Thus,
even clients signing such agreements may not fully realize what they have agreed to or given
up by agreeing to participate in treatment court.
113. See Burke, supra note 103 ("Once a drug court program has been adopted, de-
fender programs should establish their own procedures to ensure that the clients' interests
are protected and that any waiver of rights is made knowingly and voluntarily (e.g. waiver
forms), and that defender employees are trained to utilize the program effectively."); cf. In
re Richard M., 993 P.2d 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing due process requirements for
revoking juvenile's probation, including requirement that juvenile be informed of all terms
of probation in writing); DAVID LYONS, EmIIcs AND THE RULE OF Law 75 (1984) (-It is
generally considered unjust to penalize a person for failing to follow a law it is impossible to
follow. Fairness requires that a person have fair warning-the opportunity to know what is
expected of her and to decide what to do in light of that knowledge.").
114. See, e.g., People v. Parker, 711 N.Y.S.2d 656, 661 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that
when sentencing conditions imposed by court are so vague or unclear that compliance with
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Even when a drug treatment court provides the defendant with rela-
tively clear, written boundaries and guidelines in advance of her plea, the
manner in which this takes place may impair the attorney's ability to ensure
that her client's plea is fully knowledgeable. Of particular concern are pro-
grams where court personnel interview clients and review with them the
contract and various waiver forms outside the presence of counsel. With-
out witnessing this conversation, the attorney cannot know the specifics of
what the client believes she has been promised. This, too, undermines an
attorney's ability to provide effective assistance to her client,1 15 regardless
of whether she believes she is part of a team working to maintain the cli-
ent's sobriety.
The ostensibly voluntary nature of treatment court participation' 1 6
does not allay all defense concerns, nor does it absolve drug treatment
courts from their obligation to operate in an appropriate and impartial
manner. The mere fact that a program is optional should not preclude an
evaluation of how far the program can go in requiring the abandonment of
a long list of constitutional or other rights.
2. Collaborating with Other Drug Court Players
The authors believe that defense counsel may have difficulty adapting
to the collaborative nature of treatment courts. However, they argue that
such collaboration can inure to the benefit of defendants. Specifically, they
state that defense attorneys generally work with prosecutors in developing
drug treatment courts and can thus ensure the protection of defendants'
interests. The authors also argue that once the drug court is established,
them would be open to "subjective interpretation," they may violate due process by failingto provide defendant with adequate notice); see also NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS'N, supra note 87, § 6.3(a) ("Counsel should inform the client of any tentative negotiated
agreement reached with the prosecution, and explain to the client the full content of the
agreement, and the advantages and disadvantages and the potential consequences of theagreement."). A judge's duty in this situation presents a special question. For instance,
does the law require a special colloquy before permitting a drug treatment court plea? Cf.Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 679-80 (D.C. 1991) (holding that "colloquy procedure
[before allowing a defendant to waive the right to testify] would best serve all of the inter-
ests of the parties in the administration of justice").
115. See Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that defense
counsel, as part of legal advice to client, must communicate all terms of proposed guiltyplea); Risher v. United States, 992 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that defense counsel's
failure to inform client adequately about sentence prior to entering guilty plea may consti-
tute ineffective assistance of counsel).
116. Obviously, a long discussion can be had surrounding the question of whether
choosing to participate in drug court is really voluntary. Indeed, as discussed below, manydefendants entering treatment are simply accepting the shortest route to liberty. See infra
text accompanying notes 128-31. Under these circumstances, is it fair to say that the defen-dant is freely making a decision among options? In addition, some might question the vol-
untariness of any decision made by a drug user in the throes of addiction.
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defenders may protect clients' interests by identifying cases that should be
dismissed "for lack of probable cause or other problems."'1 7
However, for the individual client who finds herself within an already
established treatment court, this may amount to very little. That the de-
fense attorney118 may have taken part in the court's design certainly does
not relieve her responsibility to provide the individual client with effective
assistance of counsel and zealous representation within that court. As dis-
cussed below, the same holds true if sanctions were part of the court's origi-
nal plan and therefore anticipated or agreed upon by the defense lawyer.
Moreover, the authors may have overestimated the extent of "team"
development of drug treatment courts.119 Like other diversionary pro-
grams, most drug treatment courts operate at the whim of the prosecu-
tion.12 In New York, drug courts cannot make promises to defendants
without the approval of the Office of the District Attorney. Indeed, at the
conclusion of every case in Bronx Treatment Court, defense attorneys must
write a letter, not to the court, but to the head of the narcotics division of
the Office of the District Attorney, requesting that the client be permitted
to graduate and have the felony plea vacated, and urging a full dismissal of
the charges. Thus, it seems unlikely that defense attorneys across the coun-
try had the same voice or power as prosecutors did during the planning
stages of treatment courts.12'
Indeed, while any particular prosecutor's office may have the ability to
withdraw from treatment court participation,122 the same does not necessa-
rily hold true for a particular defense attorney or institutional defender. A
117. Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 522 (internal quotations omitted).
118. In many if not most instances, the particular attorney before the court did not
participate in the planning. It may instead have been management from the attorney's of-
fice or some other representative of the defense bar in the area.
119. See, eg., NV. Clinton Terry, III, Broward County's Dedicated Drug Treatment
Court From Postadjudication to Diversion, in THE EARLY DRUa COURTS, supra note 1, at
81-87 (discussing major agencies involved in drug court's development); Goldkamp, Treat-
ment Drug Court in Miam4 supra note 5, at 22-23 (explaining Miami drug court developed
with strong support and leadership of prosecutor's office and only later gained support of
public defender).
120. See Irby v. United States, 464 A.2d 136, 141 (D.C. 1983) (noting diversion pro-
gram "owes its existence and operation solely to prosecutorial discretion"); see also Wood-
ward v. Morrissey, 1999 OK CR 43, 991 P.2d 1042 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that
district attorney's broad power to veto defendant application to drug court does not violate
Constitution).
121. Some commentators now warn that future drug court planners should "take pains
to include both defenders and prosecutors in the planning stages of any drug court." Fein-
blatt, Berman & Fox, supra note 55, at 288. But again, inclusion can be interpreted in many
ways. And inclusion alone does not change the balance of power-i.e., who actually has the
final say in a particular decision-making process.
122. See e.g., Joyce Purnick, Drug Plan Is Clear-Cut, in Theory, N.Y. Tnms, June 26,
2000, at B1 (indicating that while Chief Judge Judith Kaye has authority to create drug
treatment courts in the State of New York, she cannot force prosecutors to use them). This
dynamic may be different in states that have created drug treatment courts through
legislation.
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public defender's office would probably not have the power to boycott a
treatment court it thought to be unfair, or if it believed its office did not
play a large enough role in its development. Moreover, individual defense
attorneys would be hard-pressed to refuse to practice in treatment court as
institutions, particularly when an individual client could benefit from such
an institution or wants to enter into a treatment program.
In addition, individual defense attorneys wield no more power in drug
courts than they do in an ordinary courtroom setting.'23 As mentioned
above, prosecutorial discretion is at the root of nearly every decision in a
criminal case in the Bronx, regardless of whether a case is routed to a tradi-
tional or treatment court. Drug treatment courts, in and of themselves, do
not give defense attorneys any greater ability to convince a prosecutor to
dismiss a case. Indeed, the drug court's overriding goal of helping clients
defeat their addictions may sometimes hamper attorney efforts to dismiss
cases when, for instance, lack of probable cause exists.
The authors correctly state that defense counsel's collaboration with
the prosecution may not be harmful to clients in all instances.1 24 In the
traditional adversarial setting there are many instances of collaboration be-
tween the prosecution and defense. For instance, prosecutors and defense
attorneys may work together to convince a reluctant judge that a particular
disposition for a case is appropriate, or to stipulate to certain evidence in
the course of a hearing or trial. However, in some instances forced non-
adversarialism can place defense attorneys in conflict with clients as well as
interfere with the provision of competent and zealous representation as re-
quired by law."z
3. Case Dumping
An additional problem cited by the authors is the potential for prose-
cutors to use treatment court as a place to "dump" weak cases. 126 To check
such behavior, the article suggests the treatment team simply "must ensure
that such actions do not take place." '127
To claim that "case dumping" will not occur merely because the treat-
ment team will make sure it does not is dubious at best. As discussed
above, the notion that all members of the team are on a level playing field
seems to be a myth, at least in my experience in a non-legislatively created
post-plea model drug court.
123. The authors seem to believe that in all treatment courts, "[diuring the screening
process, the DTC defense counsel reviews the defendant's criminal history with the prosecu-
tor and evaluates whether or not individuals meet treatment program requirements." Hora,
Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 479. I have never taken part in any formalized meet-
ings of this kind.
124. See id. at 479-80.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 220-24.
126. Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 522.
127. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 26:37
DRUG TREATMENT COURT PRACTICE
Indeed, if there were overwhelming evidence of case dumping occur-
ring on a large scale, what could the individual defense attorney or institu-
tional defender do? Perhaps a meeting might be called to address the
issue, and the drug court judge might pressure the prosecution to refrain
from the practice. Or institutional or political pressures might come to
bear on an office that was routing a large number of cases involving inno-
cent or minimally-culpable defendants to a treatment court. However,
without some kind of objective monitor on such behavior, as well as en-
forceable procedures in place to act as a safeguard, defense attorneys can
do little in such a situation except, where appropriate, advise individual
clients not to enter a plea of guilty and not to accept the treatment option.
In practice, however, advising a particular client against accepting a
guilty plea in treatment court may be of little utility in battling problems
caused by case dumping. Clients generally hold the ultimate power to de-
cide whether to plead guilty,1" and the institutional pressure to plead
guilty is quite strong. A good number of drug treatment court defendants
are arrested and held on bail for several days before the treatment court
judge sees them. Once in treatment court, they may be told that they will
be released that day to an out-patient drug treatment program if they plead
guilty.129 They are certainly entitled to reject the treatment-based plea of-
fer and fight their case, but, unless they have the means to post bail, they
will have to assert their innocence from behind bars.' 30
Thus, damage from case dumping may be done as soon as a single
weak case is deemed treatment court eligible, tracked to the treatment
court part, and an offer of treatment made. It is difficult to imagine that
many incarcerated clients in the Bronx, even those with potentially "winna-
ble" cases, would opt to exercise the right to go forvard to trial when the
"freedom" of treatment is knocking at their door.131
While it is impossible without any formal data collection to know if
cases are being "dumped" on a large scale, it appears that in a number of
individual cases, prosecutions for felony drug sale might not have been as
aggressively pursued if the defendants had not been sent to drug treatment
court. In these scenarios, even membership in the treatment court "team"
would do little to help convince the prosecution otherwise.
128. See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1996).
129. See YoUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TRmETrr COURT, supra note 72, at 3
("[U]pon defendant's consent, treatment providers conduct assessments to determine the
presence and severity of addiction, medical concerns, general mental health, family ties, etc.
Offices in the courthouse are utilized for assessing defendants who are not incarcerated.
Incarcerated defendants are assessed in holding areas.").
130. This assumes that the defendant has not been made and accepted an alternative
offer of probation. See infra note 140
131. Cf. Finkelstein, supra note 53 (indicating some experts believe drug treatment
court initiatives "might tempt some people who wanted treatment to plead guilty even if
they had not committed the crime").
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4. Proving the Need for Treatment
Hora, Schma, and Rosenthal maintain that defense attorneys worry
that the defense bears the burden of proving that a defendant actually de-
serves treatment. 32 The authors counter this concern by analogizing the
purported burden shifting to that which occurs when a defendant asserts an
affirmative defense, such as insanity.133 They further contend that the bur-
den is tempered by the fact that defendants undergo objective assessment,
including drug testing by drug court staff, to determine if they are drug
court eligible.'
However, in the Bronx, drug court eligibility is initially determined on
the basis of the charges in the case and the defendant's criminal record, not
a defendant's drug use or abuse history.135 Thus a matter is first targeted
for drug court well before the drug court's staff meets with the client. In
the end, it appears that few of the defendants routed to the Bronx Treat-
ment Court are rejected because they do not need help with drug or alco-
hol abuse. Therefore, at least in the Bronx Treatment Court, the
contention that defense counsel worry about having the burden to prove a
defendant is in need of help does not generally apply.
To the contrary, I have encountered a different set of problems relat-
ing to client eligibility. The biggest fear of rejection exists not for clients
who may not be able to prove their need for treatment, but for those who,
in some way, seem to need too much help. For instance, the Bronx Treat-
ment Court deals with only a limited number of treatment providers. Each
of these programs targets different populations and meets the needs of dif-
ferent kind of clients. Many programs are generally not equipped, for ex-
ample, to assist clients whose addictions are complicated by other problems
and demonstrate a reluctance to accept clients who present serious mental
health issues. 3 6 In addition, a client who appears to be homeless or have
an unstable housing situation may be deemed ineligible for the standard
outpatient drug treatment program by the Office of the District Attorney.
For such a client, the only option through the drug court may be to enter a
more onerous, long-term, residential treatment program.
Thus, the quandary for defense attorneys is the extent to which certain
potential drug treatment court clients should be "specially" prepared for
the interview with the treatment court staff. For instance, is it appropriate
132. See Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 522.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 72, at 2 (stating
"the District Attorney's Office reviews the charges and criminal records of all defendants to
determine whether they meet eligibility criteria," and "[t]his decision is not based on the
strength of the case or any assessment of a defendant's addiction status").
136. See, e.g., WELCOME TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 70, at 2
("Most defendants are referred to out-patient programs... including programs for clients
with mental health issues.").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. 26:37
DRUG TREATMENT COURT PRACTICE
to caution a client to avoid discussing the extent of her mental illness with
drug court staff in order to assist that client in avoiding a felony conviction?
And what advice should attorneys provide to clients who do not wish to
enter an in-patient drug treatment program but lack long-term housing?
Similar ethical dilemmas can present themselves in non-drug court
settings. 37 However, because drug court proponents advocate nearly lim-
itless disclosure on the part of defendants, 38 the tension seems particularly
acute in the treatment court arena. Moreover, if defense attorneys are
truly considered "team" players in drug treatment courts, they should have
an equal voice in establishing and adjusting the workings of these institu-
tions. This would include a greater role in determining which cases were
accepted to drug treatment court as well as choosing the treatment
providers.13 9
5. Treatment Too Onerous
Finally, the authors note that defense attorneys and their clients may
be troubled by the fact that treatment court-imposed regimes may be"more onerous than the equivalent traditional court sanctions for the same
offense."1" Again, however, the authors ascribe such concerns to igno-
rance on the part of defense attorneys: "Much of this unfounded appre-
hension comes from lack of understanding about DTCs and the concept of
therapeutic jurisprudence." '141
In the end, the authors admonish that "[t]he DTC process need not be
viewed negatively by defense attorneys," at least not those who adopt a
"therapeutic jurisprudence perspective.., to more completely represent
their clients."'142 They urge defense counsel to "view the DTC process as
137. One analogous situation might be non-drug court clients who are offered a drug
treatment program versus incarceration if they plead guilty through a program such as
TASC.
138. See Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 479 (urging defense counsel to
encourage honesty from drug court defendants).
139. Indeed, some public defender offices are especially well equipped to assist in such
an endeavor-perhaps even more so than the court or prosecution-because of the extent
to which such offices have assisted defendants in finding appropriate treatment programs in
the past and have consequently developed relationships with such organizations.
140. See Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 522-23. In the Bronx, the incep-
tion of the drug court may be viewed as having changed the "going rate" for first-time
felony drug crimes. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Most first-time felony drug
offenders in the Bronx are technically eligible for probation. That is, a defendant charged
with a B-level felony that carries a mandatory-minimum sentence of one to three years of
incarceration can be offered probation instead, if the prosecution agrees to allow her to
plead guilty to a lesser charge, such as a C-level felony. Indeed, at least one attorney has
told me that nearly every person charged with first-time felony drug crimes was offered
probation prior to the inception of the drug treatment court in the Bronx. In my experi-
ence, however, those clients who decline drug treatment court as an option are not always
offered probation. Thus, to call the Bronx Treatment Court an alternative to incarceration
for first-time felony drug offenders may be somewhat off the mark.
141. Id. at 523.
142. Id.
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the best method for ending the cycle of drugs and crime [which] is in the
best interest of the client" and will result in a "total improvement" in the
life of the client.'4 3
The level of participation required by the treatment court regime is
worrisome. 144 However, this concern does not, as the authors suggest, sim-
ply grow out of a comparison between the rigors of treatment and
non-treatment court sentences. Instead, a more complex ethical dilemma
relates to the sentence faced by defendants who fail to complete treatment.
In the Bronx Treatment Court, defendants must agree to a harsher sen-
tence if they fail to successfully complete treatment than they would have
likely received if they had simply pleaded guilty to the "top count" of the
charges against them. To participate in drug treatment court, most defend-
ants must agree to a promised sentence of two to six years of incarceration
even though the statutory minimum for the charge to which they are plead-
ing is a term of one to three years.14 5
Even though a client enters a plea in treatment court with a promise
from the court and prosecutor that if she completes the program, her fel-
ony plea will be withdrawn and no jail sentence will be imposed,146 the
situation is still unsettling. Armed with very little knowledge about the
client, an attorney must discuss with her the pros and cons of agreeing to
potentially be sentenced to a greater term of incarceration than she would
have ordinarily faced under the circumstances. 47 In such a situation, it is
hard to know whether the client presents a good "risk" for treatment 141
and to provide her with meaningful advice about whether to accept the
plea offer. In effect, the attorney may be gambling with a client's future
without sufficient information. The fact that, like all clients, drug treat-
ment court clients should be treated as autonomous individuals 149 who are
143. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
144. In the Bronx, most clients participating in the drug treatment court attend an in-
tensive out-patient drug treatment program for at least twenty hours per week, over a pe-
riod of twelve to eighteen months. See BRONX TREATMENT COURT CLIENr INFORMATION
GUIDE, supra note 76, at 3.
145. As noted above, this two to six year indeterminate sentence is far greater than
most first-time drug sale defendants could receive outside of the treatment court by plea-
bargain. Drug court defendants are generally charged with B-level drug sale cases. The
prosecutor, for purposes of plea bargaining, could reduce the charge to a C- or D-level
felony, which would make the defendant eligible for probation or a prison sentence of less
than one to three years. Moreover, even if she pleaded guilty to the "top count," few judges
would impose more than the minimum one to three year indeterminate sentence.
146. As indicated earlier, successful participants typically receive a misdemeanor on
their record. In exceptional cases, the charges are dismissed altogether. See supra text ac-
companying note 79.
147. Guilty pleas in the Bronx Treatment Court, like any other pre-indictment guilty
plea in the Bronx, are often entered within a few days of a defendant's arraignment.
148. For obvious reasons, one can never tell with certainty who will succeed in
treatment.
149. Cf. Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717 (1987) (discuss-
ing difficulty of respecting client autonomy while working to protect client interests).
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ultimately responsible for deciding whether to plead guilty or proceed to
trial,15 does little to allay both the moralis t and lega115 concerns such a
situation presents for the practitioner.
C. More Questions to Answer the Question:
Post-Plea Status Hearings, Right to Counsel,
and Role of Counsel
The authors of Drug Treatment Court Movement and other commenta-
tors fail to address another important set of issues for defense attorneys:
post-plea status hearings, including the right to and role of counsel at such
proceedings. 3 As outlined above, defendants at the Bronx Treatment
Court who have pleaded guilty are required to frequently provide the judge
with information about their progress in treatment.'- Specifically,
"[d]efendants appear in court either biweekly or monthly on the day their
program is on site to speak to the judge about their progress or any set-
backs they may be experiencing."15s
In the Bronx Treatment Court, the treatment provider sends a written
progress report for each defendant to the court prior to such court appear-
ances.156 The report notes absences, urinalysis results, and other informa-
tion relating to the defendant's participation in treatmentY5 However,
neither the defendant nor defense counsel are generally provided with
150. See Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492,497 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing AN-.morw' G. ArtsTmE.
DAM, TRiAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 339 (Nat'l Legal Aid &
Defender Ass'n ed., 1988)).
151. Cf Ellmann, supra note 149, at 764-73 (addressing attorney paternalism in shap-
ing client decision-making).
152. See Boria, 99 F.3d at 497 ("A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to
advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable.")
(citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIIrTY, EC 7-7 (1992)). Indeed, under ordinary
circumstances in the Bronx, if a first-time felony drug offender were advised by her attorney
to accept a plea offer involving a sentence of two to six years, most attorneys would agree
that such advice was incompetent. The drug treatment court in this same jurisdiction re-
quires that the client attend a drug program each day for over a year, be closely monitored
by the court, and give up privacy rights simply to avoid that two to six year sentence. How
should an attorney advise the drug court client in such a court? See Boria, 99 F.3d at 497
("Effective assistance of counsel includes counsel's informed opinion as to what pleas
should be entered.") (citations omitted).
153. These proceedings have no formal legal designation under New York's criminal
procedure law. This article will refer to them as status hearings or case updates.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
155. WELCOMIE TO THE BRONX TREATmENT COURT, supra note 70, at 3. The court's
literature further provides that "[t]he judge, the district attorney, the defense attorney and
the treatment provider meet daily to review the defendants' progress." Id. This, however,
has not been my experience. While I may discuss a defendant's situation with the court or
its staff on an informal, sporadic basis, the Office of the District Attorney has never met
with me to discuss the progress of any of my clients.
156. In practice the reports are usually sent to the Bronx Treatment Court by facsimile
either the day before the status hearing or the morning of such an appearance.
157. See YOUR GuIE TO THE BRONX TREAaNimrr COURT, supra note 72, at 4 (-The
treatment programs provide on-going information to the court, prosecution and defense
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treatment provider update reports in advance of the scheduled court ap-
pearance.158 As a result, the defendant and defense attorney may receive
notice of an alleged drug court infraction at the moment they step before
the judge. 159
Aside from failing to provide defendants and attorneys with notice of
alleged infractions prior to scheduled status hearings, the Bronx Treatment
Court also conducts unscheduled status hearings by sua sponte advancing
the cases of some defendants. 60 The court may call for such an un-
scheduled hearing if, for example, a defendant is re-arrested for possessing
a quantity of drugs consistent with personal use or is returned on a warrant
after failing to appear for a scheduled Bronx Treatment Court appear-
ance.161 When the court advances a case, it does not always notify defense
counsel. Thus defendants may be seen by the judge, questioned, and sanc-
tioned, all without an attorney present.
Indeed, within the treatment court a culture of informality has devel-
oped whereby most players in the court view the presence of a defense
attorney at status hearings as nonessential, even for scheduled hearings. A
number of factors may contribute to this pattern. For instance, institutional
defender offices such as The Bronx Defenders have not received additional
funding to provide drug treatment court representation. Since drug court
matters tend to last longer than other cases and involve many more court
appearances, limited resources present a challenge to defenders practicing
in drug court.162 Defense attorneys have also developed trust in the presid-
ing treatment court judge. They believe that the judge hearing their cases
has a history of fairness with clients and will not treat clients unjustly. Thus
attorneys busy with other court matters and who cannot wait for the drug
court to reach their cases simply "check in" with clients to verify that they
are doing well in treatment, but allow clients who appear to be in compli-
ance to appear at status hearings by themselves.
attorneys about defendants' progress, and discuss phase advancements, incentives and sanc-
tions for defendants with the judge and the treatment team.").
158. In my experience, if defense counsel wish to see reports for their clients prior to
their status hearings, they must come to the Bronx Treatment Court at the courthouse to
review them the evening before or the morning of the scheduled court appearance.
159. YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 72, at 4.
160. WELCOME TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 70, at 4 ("[T]he close
partnership between the court and treatment providers ensures immediate intervention,
even when a defendant is not regularly scheduled for a court appearance.").
161. YOUR GUIDE TO THE BRONX TREATMENT COURT, supra note 72, at 4 ("The treat-
ment programs provide on-going information to the court, prosecution and defense attor-
neys about defendants' progress, and discuss phase advancements, incentives and sanctions
for defendants with the judge and the treatment team."). Notably, the literature also does
not define the term "treatment team." It is unclear whether defense counsel are intended to
be part of such teams.
162. Obviously, increased funding to public defender organizations in jurisdictions with
treatment courts would help to alleviate this burden.
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The treatment court's articulated goals may also contribute to this at-
mosphere. For instance, since the court's main concern is each client's pro-
gress in treatment, it seems to consider the presence of a program
representative or a written update much more essential than the presence
of defense counsel. Courthouse staff, interested in moving the court calen-
dar along as quickly as possible, may view expediting cases as more impor-
tant than ensuring the presence of counsel at routine updates. Thus,
whether intentionally or not, attorney representation is not always pro-
vided at status hearings.163
Obviously, a defendant in a post-plea drug court like the Bronx Treat-
ment Court has already made an admission of guilt, and the court has
promised a specific jail sentence if the defendant fails to complete treat-
ment. However, because no actual sentence has been imposed, final judg-
ment or adjudication has not been rendered. Thus status hearings are a
procedural anomaly in need of greater legal clarification. The question of
whether defense counsel must be afforded at these "special" proceed-
ings,"- and if so, what her role should be, is addressed below.
1. Should Counsel Be Present at Status Hearings?
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.""16 This right, which "attaches" once the adversarial process
has begun and the defendant is charged with a crime,'6 applies to more
than just the trial phase of criminal proceedings.167
When entering a plea to charges against her, a defendant is entitled to
assistance of counsel168 regardless of whether the plea takes place at ar-
raignment169 or at a preliminary hearing.1 70 And a defendant's right to
counsel obviously extends beyond those instances in a criminal proceeding
163. Given the large number of cases they have in the court, the Legal Aid Society, the
primary public defender in the jurisdiction, has been able to assign one attorney to the
treatment court on a full-time basis. The Legal Aid Society's attorney does not cover
non-Legal Aid cases, however. For a discussion of the coverage of non-Legal Aid cases,
see Schreibersdorf, supra note 6.
164. For instance, New York's Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate such
a proceeding. See, e.g., N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 380.30(1) (McKinney 2001) (providing that
"[s]entence must be pronounced without unreasonable delay").
165. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
166. See Moran v. Berdine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986).
167. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1945) (reversing conviction of de-
fendant tried without assistance of counsel); see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
309-10 (1973) ("Later developments have led this Court to recognize that 'Assistance'
would be less than meaningful if it were limited to the formal trial itself.").
168. See Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 489 (1945) (reversing conviction of defen-
dant who pleaded guilty to charge of murder in first degree without being permitted to
consult with counsel).
169. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
170. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (finding that preliminary hearing in
Maryland is "critical stage" of criminal proceeding).
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where the question is that of guilt or innocence. The controlling principle,
as set forth in Hamilton v. Alabama, is whether the event in question can
be viewed as a "critical stage" of the criminal proceeding warranting the"guiding hand of counsel.' 17 1
Using this standard, the Supreme Court has extended the right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to postindictment line-up identifica-
tion procedures172 and interrogations. 73 In such situations, even though
the defendant is not necessarily facing an adversary in a courtroom, de-
fense attorneys may be called upon to serve "as a spokesman for, or advi-
sor to, the accused."' 74
In 1948 the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a defendant was
entitled to representation by counsel following a determination of guilt. 175
In determining that the defendant's rights had been violated by the failure
to provide defendant with counsel at sentencing, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is evident that this uncounseled defendant was either over-
reached by the prosecution's submission of misinformation to the
court or was prejudiced by the court's own misreading of the re-
cord. Counsel, had any been present, would have been under a
duty to prevent the court from proceeding on false assumptions
and perhaps under a duty to seek remedy elsewhere if they per-
sisted .... In this case, counsel might not have changed the sen-
tence, but he could have taken steps to see that the conviction and
sentence were not predicated on misinformation or misreading of
court records, a requirement of fair play which absence of counsel
withheld from this prisoner.176
Even when a defendant is placed on probation she has the right to be rep-
resented at any subsequent probation revocation hearing. 177 In Mempa v.
Rhay the Court reiterated that "appointment of counsel for an indigent is
required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of
a criminal accused may be affected.' 178 It further rejected the notion that
the "imposition of sentence following probation is... a mere formality"
even though the defendants in Mempa were already informed of their
171. See Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 54.
172. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
173. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). A defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
174. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973).
175. In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), the defendant was unrepresented by
counsel at his sentencing hearing. The facts showed that the court made its sentencing de-
termination based in part upon an erroneous understanding of the defendant's prior crimi-
nal record. Id. at 740. That is, the court assumed certain prior theft charges resulted in
convictions, when in fact they had been dismissed.
176. Id. at 740-41.
177. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
178. Id. at 134.
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promised sentence "at the time they were originally placed on proba-
tion."' 79 The Court concluded "a lawyer must be afforded at this proceed-
ing whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred
sentencing."'180
In applying the above analysis to post-plea drug treatment court status
hearings, it would seem that a defendant must be afforded legal counsel. If
a defendant is alleged to have violated a drug court rule, a right of the
defendant might be affected-namely, her right to liberty-by way of a
court sanction. And regardless of whether the defendant agreed to accept
such a sanction at the time of her guilty plea, she must be given the oppor-
tunity to have counsel defend her-even if that simply means presenting
mitigating evidence on the client's behalf.
However, a recent New York Court of Appeals case dealing with
guilty pleas involving treatment through Treatment Alternatives to Street
Crime (TASC) suggests that the Constitution does not provide a right to
counsel at certain treatment-related status hearings.181 In People v. Garcia,
the defendant had pleaded guilty and been promised a sentence of four and
one-half to nine years of incarceration if he failed to complete an eighteen-
month in-patient drug treatment program through TASC.'1 After partici-
pating in the program for several months, the defendant was allegedly
ejected for violating its rules.8 3 The defendant was purportedly at large
for several months before he was returned to court on a bench warrant.""
Once before the court, the defendant explained that he was turned away
from the drug treatment program because he attended a banquet for other
members of the treatment program without permission.""~
The court remanded the defendant and TASC considered placing the
defendant into another program. 8 6 The court adjourned the matter for
three additional dates for TASC to attempt to find an alternative place-
ment for defendant. 117 Counsel was not present at any of the three ad-
journment dates. 1' On the last of the three dates, having been unable to
find a treatment placement for the defendant, the TASC representative
told the presiding judge he could proceed to sentencing if he wanted. 8 9 At
the next court appearance, defense counsel was present and was told that
179. I. at 135.
180. Id at 137.
181. People v. Garcia, 708 N.E.2d 992 (N.Y. 1999).
182. Id. at 992-93.
183. Id at 993.
184. IL
185. Id.
186. Id
187. Id.
188. it
189. Id.
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the court wished to impose the promised sentence. 190 Over defense coun-
sel's request that the defendant be given another opportunity to complete
treatment, the court sentenced the defendant to a term of incarceration of
four and one-half to nine years.' 9 ' Because he was not represented at the
proceeding in which TASC informed the court it had no objection to the
court's imposing sentence, the defendant appealed the court's decision,
claiming a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court
of Appeals, deciding against defendant, held that the court appearance was
not a "critical stage" of the criminal prosecution as contemplated by the
Constitution "where counsels' absence might prejudice due process
rights."'192 The proceeding, the court stated, did not depend "upon an arbi-
ter's determination as to the truth of assertions of misconduct." '193 Rather,
"[t]he only issues addressed at the.., proceeding were administrative con-
cerns that the court sought to have answered by the TASC representative
*.. and the defendant's views were not relevant to TASC's decision to
readmit him or its ability... to find a new program for him. '194
The Garcia decision reads too great a limit into the concept of right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, as already discussed, there
are many stages of the criminal prosecution that are "critical" even when a
defendant is not called upon to answer allegations. 95 Moreover, drug
court status hearings, even where the defendant is not in violation, involve
the direct interrogation of the defendant by an arm of the government-
the treatment court judge-in the presence of the prosecution. As such,
the right to counsel would seem to apply absent an express waiver.196 This
is so even though the court's inquiry does not relate to guilt or innocence
but to other issues potentially relevant to the final disposition of the
case. 197
Nevertheless, even if the presence of counsel were not constitutionally
mandated at such status hearings, counsel should be present with the de-
fendant for other reasons. If a defense attorney is supposed to be part of a
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 993-94.
193. Id. at 994.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that post-indictmentlineup was critical stage of prosecution, activating defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel).
196. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
197. See Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 686 (1989) (per curiam) (holding that state vio-lated Sixth Amendment by failing to provide notice to defense attorney before forcing de-
fendant to undergo psychiatric evaluation to determine his future danger to society);Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1988) (same); see also CAROLINE S. CooPER,
NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., ISSUES RAISED FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DRUG COURT REp.
RESENTATION RELEVANT TO THE ABA CANONS OF ETHics: CANONS 2-4 (Draft) (1999),
available at http//www.american.edu/academic.depts/spa/justice/ndciethics.htm (outlining
proposed best practices in light of canons of ethics).
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"team" working towards a defendant's sobriety, it seems more "therapeu-
tic" for defense counsel to be present for all proceedings when the defen-
dant is doing well, so as to convey congratulations and positive
reinforcement. In addition, by having counsel present at all times, courts
might be able to avoid challenges like the one seen in Garcia.193 Finally,
regardless of the parameters of the Sixth Amendment, counsel must fulfill
ethical obligations to their clients, even after conviction and up through
sentencing. 199 Thus, as status hearings might be viewed as incremental
components of the sentencing hearing, courts should ensure that cases are
not handled without defense counsel present to provide the client with ad-
vice and counsel.2 °0
2. What Is the Role of Counsel at Status Hearings?
With regard to the role of defense attorneys generally, the Supreme
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has clearly established a standard
of "effective assistance" of counsel. 20 Obviously, most of the case law
dealing with the issue of effective assistance of counsel involves post-con-
viction claims of ineffectiveness. 2 In deciding whether counsel has pro-
vided ineffective assistance in a particular case, a court vil determine
whether the attorney's performance fell below some objective standard of
reasonable behavior, and, if so, whether such performance actually
prejudiced the defendant.2 3 However, this test is largely informed by our
198. Admittedly, this argument may not have as much sway in jurisdictions like the
Bronx, where defendants are required to waive their right to appeal to participate in the
court.
199. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.3 cmt. (1983) ("Unless the relationship
is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all mat-
ters undertaken for a client."); id. R. 1.16 cmt. ("A lawyer should not accept representation
in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of
interest and to completion."); cf. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, supra note 87,
§ 8.7 cmt. ("This Guideline assumes counsel's presence at sentencing .... Counsel must not
treat, and must not allow the court to treat, a sentencing hearing as a routine matter.").
200. Cf. AN1. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON THE PROSECUTION & DiEF. FuNcno.Ns, STAN.
DARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FuNCTION 34-35
("Defense counsel should present to the court any ground which will assist in reaching a
proper disposition favorable to the accused ... Counsel should alert the accused to his right
of allocution, if any, and to the possible dangers of making a judicial confession in the
course of allocution which might tend to prejudice his appeal."); NAT'L LEGAL AID & DE-
FENDER ASS'N, supra note 87, § 8.7 ("Counsel should be prepared at the sentencing pro-
ceeding to take the steps necessary to advocate fully for the requested sentence and to
protect the client's interest .... Where appropriate, counsel should prepare the client to
personally address the court.").
201. See, ag., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (reiterating that
defendants "are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel").
202. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (finding defense counsel's
failure to investigate mitigating evidence in sentencing phase of capital trial was neither so
deficient nor so prejudicial as to constitute ineffective assistance violative of Sixth Amend-
ment); Harris v. Reed, 894 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that defense attorney rendered
ineffective assistance at defendant's murder trial by failing to call any witnesses).
203. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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justice system's interest in finality and the problems inherent in second-
guessing an attorney's strategic decisions,2" and is not the standard by
which practicing attorneys should measure their own performance.2 0 5 As
has been pointed out by NLADA, practices on the part of an attorney that
do not rise to the level of ineffectiveness under Strickland may still violate
controlling legal and ethical norms."0 6
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct 20 7 provide that as a client's representative, a lawyer must be willing to
perform several functions."' 8 These include serving as an advisor, an advo-
cate, a negotiator, and an intermediary on behalf of a client. Thus the role
of an effective attorney is not limited to a particular trial-based function.
For instance, Model Rule 1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with rea-
sonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. '20 9 As a com-
mentary to this rule, the drafters state:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite op-
position, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and
may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.210
NLADA's guidelines for defense attorneys explain that zealousness and
quality representation are in fact "the paramount obligation" of defense
attorneys and must be provided at "all stages of the criminal process. '211
204. Compare Weekley v. Jones, 76 F.3d 1459 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that failure topresent evidence of insanity is legitimate strategy) with Genius v. Pepe, 50 F.3d 60 (1st Cir.
1995) (finding that attorney's strategy, which involved foregoing insanity defense, was inef-
fective assistance of counsel).
205. See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 87, § 1.1 cmt. ("Actions or
inactions that do not meet the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in a given case may
still constitute poor representation").
206. Id. (citing Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988)).
207. Each state has its own set of ethical rules, usually based upon the American BarAssociation (ABA)'s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, or some combination of both. While a majority of states haveadopted a form of the Model Rules, only the individual state standards are legally binding,regardless of whether they correspond to the ABA model. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RON.
ALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 12 (5th ed. 1991).
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983).
209. Id. R. 1.3.
210. Id. R. 1.3 cmt.; see also NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, supra note 87,
§ 1.1; Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 77 (1995) (observing that "criminal defense lawyers areethically required to serve as zealous advocates and to vigorously challenge the state's
case").
211. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 87, § 1.1; see also id. cmt.(explaining that zealousness and quality representation are lens through which all actions of
defense attorneys must be examined).
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Confidentiality is also an important component of effective and ethical
representation. Lawyers "shall not reveal information relating to represen-
tation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the represen-
tation." 2 ' The Model Rules go on to explain that "[a] fundamental princi-
ple in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain
confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is
thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lavyer even
as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter." '13 In addition,
"the confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the represen-
tation, whatever the source. 2 14
Moreover, consistent with Sixth Amendment principles, Model Rule
1.7 creates a duty of loyalty to the client on behalf of the attorney'-' This
loyalty is breached "when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry
out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's
other responsibilities or interests. 2 1 6
Given these principles, what role should an attorney play in drug treat-
ment court status hearings in a post-plea jurisdiction? Consider the situa-
tion where a defendant is alleged to have failed several urinalysis tests and,
as a result, is being threatened with the sanction of a period of time in jail
or a weeklong detoxification in a hospital. According to DOJ's Key Com-
ponents, it would appear that in such situations the defense counsel should
simply explain to the defendant that her in-court statements will not sub-
ject her to further prosecution, inform her that she "will be expected to
speak directly to the judge, not through an attorney[,]" and encourage her
"to be truthful with the judge and with treatment staff. 11 7 If, however, the
attorney were to provide such advice and stand by, allowing the court to
impose whatever sanction it chose, her conduct would seem to be less than
satisfactory under the law. First, for a lawyer to advise the client to fully
212. MODEL RuLns OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). Note that beyond the ethical
duty imposed upon attorneys to maintain information in confidence, state and federal laws
and regulations also prohibit the disclosure of certain protected information. See, e.g., 42
C.F.R. § 2.11 (1995). For a discussion of federal confidentiality laws and their interplay withdrug treatment court practices, see generally FEDERAL CONFIDENTIALrY LAWS, supra note
90.
213. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
214. Id
215. MODEL Rtns OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7 (1983).
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
party, or by the lawyers own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after
consultation.
Id.
216. Id- R. 1.7 cmt.; see also NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 87,
§ 1.3(b).
217. KEY CompoNENTs, supra note 57, at 14.
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disclose the drug use information to the court could certainly chill all future
communications regarding drug use between client and attorney if the re-
sult of such disclosure is a sanction such as incarceration. Moreover, given
that a defense attorney must act zealously at all stages of a criminal pro-
ceeding, the attorney would seem to have a duty to try to prevent the court
from imposing sanctions infringing a defendant's liberty or other rights-
regardless of whether the client had previously agreed to sanctions for
infractions.
One helpful analogy is that of a defendant who is placed on probation
and agrees to abide by certain terms. If a defense attorney attends a proba-
tion revocation hearing, advises her client to disclose all violations of the
probation's terms, and offers no argument on behalf of the client, in mitiga-
tion or otherwise, the advice of counsel would be considered unsatisfactory
by most-unless the court had made some offer of a lesser sentence if the
defendant would admit to the wrongdoing and forgo a formal hearing.
Consider, also, a scenario where drug court staff calls aside a defense
attorney for arguing too vehemently against a jail sanction for a client fail-
ing to comply with the rigors of the drug court program.218 Does the expla-
nation that the treatment court utilizes a "team approach" where all
players work towards the goal of maintaining a client's sobriety, permit a
defense attorney to abandon strong advocacy efforts? In my opinion, an
attorney who chooses this course would be legally ineffective219 given the
conflict presented22 -whether to heed the suggestions of the court staff221
and forgo arguments that would ordinarily be made on behalf of a client,
simply to become a better member of the drug court team. While a de-
fense attorney may assist in helping a client achieve sobriety, drug courts
should not require counsel to abandon other legally mandated goals, such
as protection of a client's liberty interests, even if these conflict with the
goals of the rest of the "team."
In addition, the appropriate role of counsel at status hearings extends
beyond simply advocating against sanctions for clients who are alleged to
have broken drug court rules. In most settings, due process requirements
218. This hypothetical is based upon an experience of one of my colleagues.
219. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that attorneys areineffective when their ability to make independent decisions for clients are blocked by offi-cial government action); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (holding that conflict of
interest adversely affecting defense attorney's performance results in ineffective assistance
of counsel).
220. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.7 cmt. (1983) (admonishing attor-
neys not to allow other obligations to prevent them from taking appropriate action for
client).
221. Official government action creates a conflict of interest "when it interferes in cer-
tain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct
the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
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dictate that defense counsel be provided with timely notice of alleged viola-
tions of their clients,' as well as an opportunity to meaningfully challenge
them in order to provide competent representation. a Particularly when
alleged violations relate to positive drug test results which can be of ques-
tionable reliability. 4 defense counsel should be permitted to challenge the
accuracy of such allegations. To ensure a defendant's right to due process
of law and effective representation, courts should conduct some sort of evi-
dentiary hearing to determine if a violation has occurred before imposing
sanctions.
V.
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF DRUG
TRBATMENT COURTS
There can be little doubt that drug treatment courts may provide an
attractive alternative to traditional case processing to the defense bar-for
instance, by allowing defendants charged with felony-level drug charges to
have their cases dismissed or resolved with only a misdemeanor conviction.
And drug courts such as the Bronx Treatment Court have generated many
success stories-helping move drug addicts towards sobriety. Nevertheless,
as this article only begins to demonstrate, such "problem-solving" courts
present their own unique set of potential problems for the criminal defense
practitioner.
Given the issues raised, it is clear that drug treatment courts as an
institution, and the practices that have developed therein, must undergo
greater scrutiny and analysis. The implications-both theoretical and ac-
tual-of the "teamwork" approach advocated by drug court proponents
must be rigorously reviewed. Specifically, future assessments of drug
222. Cf. Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P2d 894 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (hold-
ing that in drug treatment court, in order to meet due process and statutory requirements,
written notice must be provided to defendant setting forth alleged violations of drug court
rules before defendant can be terminated from drug court program).
223. Cf. State v. Valentine, No. 98-1-06965-8, 2000 WL 628996, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.
May 15,2000) (reversing and ordering hearing because defendant's "due process rights were
violated when the trial court terminated her from the Drug Court program without afford-
ing her a meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations of noncompliance"); cf.
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 87, § 8.7:
In the event that there will be disputed facts before the court at sentencing, coun-
sel should consider requesting an evidentiary hearing. Where a sentencing hearing
will be held, counsel should ascertain who has the burden of proving a fact unfa-
vorable to the defendant, be prepared to object if the burden is placed on the
defense, and be prepared to present evidence, including testimony of witnesses, to
contradict erroneous or misleading information unfavorable to the defendant.
lId
224. See, e.g., Bowen v. State, 531 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing revocation
of probation because drug test used not shown to be reliable).
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courts should spend less time simply lauding the concept of court-moni-
tored treatment as judicial innovation, and instead ask more probing ques-
tions about what is actually happening in such forums on a day-to-day basis
and whether such practices comport with the law. Those practicing within
drug courts, including defense attorneys, must give voice to their exper-
iences,2  play a more substantial role in drug court discourse, and be in-
cluded in future conversations about the evolution of these developing
institutions.
Only with honest, in-depth studies in hand can members of the legal
community begin to undertake modifications necessary to improve drug
court practice, such as development of clear guidelines for drug court pro-
fessionals that reflect prevailing legal and ethical standards. 26 Any sug-
gested model rules drafted only by drug court proponents who do not see
problems with existing practices, or who fail to take into account the past
experiences and problems faced by practitioners, must be met with skepti-
cism. Model rules must seek to ensure that aside from receiving treatment,
defendants in drug courts are also provided with effective assistance of
counsel and due process of law. They should specifically outline permissi-
ble procedures at all stages of drug court proceedings-including status
hearings. Ultimately, state legislatures may need to adopt enforceable
guidelines so that violations may be remediable.
With regard to effective representation within drug courts, the burden
should not simply fall upon public defender offices without the provision of
additional resources. For each drug court that is created in a particular
region, court-appointed attorneys and other court staff are called upon to
change their practices and provide a broader range of services. Accord-
ingly, in every jurisdiction that has a drug court, local institutional defend-
ers should be provided with additional funding to meet the challenge. With
such funds, public defender offices can begin to develop greater drug court
expertise and better represent drug court clients on a day-to-day basis.
In the end, I do not advocate abandonment of the drug court model,
but a pulling back on the reigns of the present high-speed drug court"movement." Only in this way will we be able to adequately evaluate
where drug treatment courts have been and more thoughtfully determine
where they should be going. If we do not take the time to pause for such
225. On December 1, 2000, NLADA included as part of its Washington, D.C., confer-
ence a panel presentation entitled, "The Defender Role in Problem-Solving Courts: Ethics
and Advocacy." More such discussions should take place across the country and include the
voices of practitioners.
226. Some defender organizations have begun to develop their own proposed sets of
guidelines for specialized courts. For instance, the American Council of Chief Defenders
has drafted ten principles for problem solving courts intended "to ensure that such courts
afford equal participation to defenders and protect clients' rights. See Nat'l Legal Aid and
Defender Ass'n, Reno Launches NLADA American Council of Chief Defenders, INDIGENT
DEF. (Oct./Nov. 2000), available at http://www.nlada.org/p-defendll-01.htm; see also
COOPER, supra note 197.
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deliberate analysis, necessary modification, and future planning, drug
courts may never attain unconditional legal legitimacy. And this public de-
fender, for one, will continue to have legal and ethical reservations when
called upon to play a role on a drug court "team."
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